Brickbats (Old)

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While most of my blog read­ers like my analy­sis, the same can’t be said for the eco­nom­ics pro­fes­sion in gen­er­al, let alone the so called mar­ket economists–mainly but not exclu­sive­ly Chief Econ­o­mists for banks (I would be curi­ous to find out what their own “inter­nal press” looks like!).  This page will record some of the neg­a­tive press I’ve received as a result–and also com­ments, such as ex-PM John Howard’s recent com­ment, that argue this isn’t a major cri­sis.

It should prove an inter­est­ing lit­mus test over time. If I am wrong, then these com­men­ta­tors can bask in their own “I told you so” moments. And if not…

Priceless

I’ll keep a per­ma­nent record of out­stand­ing­ly bad pre­dic­tions here, and a rolling parade of attacks,  gaffes and “it’ll all be over by Christ­mas” pre­dic­tions in “Run of the Mill”.

The piece of cake here has to go to Ger­ard Bak­er of The Times of Lon­don on Jan­u­ary 19, 2007:

Wel­come to ‘the Great Mod­er­a­tion’ His­to­ri­ans will mar­vel at the sta­bil­i­ty of our era.

Econ­o­mists have coined a term for this remark­able peri­od of sta­bil­i­ty. Tak­ing their cue from the Great Depres­sion of the 1930s and the Great Infla­tion of the 1970s and 1980s, they have called the cur­rent era the Great Mod­er­a­tion.”

And sec­ond prize goes to Ben Bernanke him­self, for a speech he gave in Feb­ru­ary 2004 on the same top­ic:

Remarks by Gov­er­nor Ben S. Bernanke at the meet­ings of the East­ern Eco­nom­ic Asso­ci­a­tion, Wash­ing­ton, DC: The Great Mod­er­a­tion.

My view is that improve­ments in mon­e­tary pol­i­cy, though cer­tain­ly not the only fac­tor, have prob­a­bly been an impor­tant source of the Great Mod­er­a­tion. In par­tic­u­lar, I am not con­vinced that the decline in macro­eco­nom­ic volatil­i­ty of the past two decades was pri­mar­i­ly the result of good luck, as some have argued, though I am sure good luck had its part to play as well. In the remain­der of my remarks, I will pro­vide some sup­port for the “improved-mon­e­tary-pol­i­cy” expla­na­tion for the Great Mod­er­a­tion…”

Of course, Ben has more than just one rea­son to be nom­i­nat­ed here. Who could for­get his “On Mil­ton Fried­man’s Nineti­eth Birth­day”:

Let me end my talk by abus­ing slight­ly my sta­tus as an offi­cial rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the Fed­er­al Reserve. I would like to say to Mil­ton and Anna: Regard­ing the Great Depres­sion. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sor­ry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”

or “Defla­tion: Mak­ing Sure “It” Does­n’t Hap­pen Here”:

Thus, as I have stressed already, pre­ven­tion of defla­tion remains prefer­able to hav­ing to cure it. If we do fall into defla­tion, how­ev­er, we can take com­fort that the log­ic of the print­ing press exam­ple must assert itself, and suf­fi­cient injec­tions of mon­ey will ulti­mate­ly always reverse a defla­tion.”

Adam Carr, senior econ­o­mist at ICAP Aus­tralia, Busi­ness Spec­ta­tor. MAKE AUSTRALIA WORK: For­get the defla­tion bogey­man. I expect this argu­ment will prove to be an excel­lent exam­ple of the propo­si­tion that there is noth­ing more dan­ger­ous than a bad theory–and that peo­ple who have a bad the­o­ry, a.k.a. econ­o­mists who believe in “neo­clas­si­cal eco­nom­ics”, helped cause this cri­sis and then have no idea of its sever­i­ty, or how to fight it. My next Debt­watch will argue that call­ing our finan­cial sys­tem a “fiat cur­ren­cy” one is akin to the para­ble of the blind man decid­ing that an ele­phant was a snake when he felt its trunk.

Fatal­ists will pipe up that the world is lit­tered with defla­tion­ary episodes and that, indeed, is the truth. For instance, dur­ing much of the 19th cen­tu­ry many nations expe­ri­enced defla­tion­ary peri­ods and pri­or to that, his­to­ry shows that prices were just as like­ly to increase as decrease. Yet there is one fun­da­men­tal dif­fer­ence between those peri­ods and now – mon­ey isn’t backed by any­thing, such as gold or what have you. In oth­er words, mon­ey has no intrin­sic val­ue and this is called a fiat cur­ren­cy sys­tem.

In this cur­rent cri­sis, if the US mon­e­tary base was shrink­ing and the Fed was doing noth­ing about it, then defla­tion may have some cred­i­bil­i­ty. Yet the Fed isn’t doing noth­ing – inter­est rates are at zero and ‘cred­it eas­ing’ is in vogue. The US mon­e­tary base has con­se­quent­ly expand­ed at its fastest pace in mod­ern eco­nom­ic his­to­ry.

That being the case, it seems to me that the great­est error the RBA could make right now would be to cut too aggres­sive­ly and so be ill-pre­pared should the econ­o­my (glob­al and domes­tic) turn out to be stronger than every­one is fore­cast­ing.

Think back to the con­ver­sa­tions we were all hav­ing this time last year. Every­one was fore­cast­ing a stronger-for-ever Chi­nese growth cycle and per­ma­nent infla­tion pres­sures. That con­sen­sus was wrong last year and while things are very uncer­tain now, it’s not beyond the realm of pos­si­bil­i­ty that the con­sen­sus is wrong again. The con­se­quences of this are very seri­ous and would neces­si­tate a desta­bil­is­ing series of rate hikes as the pen­du­lum again swung to infla­tion hys­te­ria.

Feb­ru­ary 20: John Howard, Five great reforms are an essen­tial lega­cy.

The lega­cy of the for­mer Lib­er­al gov­ern­ment is one that we should all want to own. Aus­tralia was a stronger, proud­er and more pros­per­ous nation in Novem­ber 2007 than it had been in March 1996. Yet attempts have been made to dis­count the con­tri­bu­tions of com­pet­i­tive cap­i­tal­ism and more open mar­kets to the remark­able eco­nom­ic growth, in many nations, dur­ing these past 30 years.

Eco­nom­ic change of the type Aus­tralia expe­ri­enced over this time has been exten­sive and, to many, unset­tling but it has been accept­ed as nec­es­sary.

In 1980 our nation need­ed five great reforms. We need­ed to dereg­u­late our finan­cial sys­tem, fun­da­men­tal­ly change our tax­a­tion sys­tem, make our labour mar­kets freer, reduce exces­sive­ly high tar­iffs and rid the gov­ern­ment of own­er­ship of com­mer­cial enter­pris­es that would be bet­ter run pri­vate­ly. By 2007 these five great reforms had been achieved.

Those five reforms were an essen­tial Aus­tralian con­tri­bu­tion to what one might prop­er­ly describe as the neo-lib­er­al exper­i­ment of the past 30 years.

Feb­ru­ary 20 2009: RBA Gov­er­nor Glenn Stevens is cur­rent­ly in the hot seat, fac­ing a Par­lia­men­tary Com­mit­tee at a reg­u­lar twice a year brief­ing.

Six months ago, he had sat in front of the Com­mit­tee defend­ing an inter­est rate hik­ing pro­gram that had pushed the cash rate from a low of 4.25% in 2001 to a high of 7.25% (includ­ing one famous and unprece­dent­ed rate hike dur­ing the 2007 elec­tion cam­paign), but which had just gone into mild reverse with a 0.25% cut days before he front­ed the Com­mit­tee. Today, he has to explain why the RBA was caught so unawares by the direc­tion the world econ­o­my moved in, and why infla­tion tar­get­ting has gone out the win­dow as the rate has been cut by 4% in five months to a decades-low lev­el of 3.25%. Here is his open­ing address to the Com­mit­tee, with his speech­es in Sep­tem­ber 2008 and April 2008 for com­par­i­son. Let’s hope the ques­tion­ing reflects the seri­ous­ness of the change in events, and the whys and where­for­es of the RBA’s fail­ure to see what con­trar­i­ans like myself antic­i­pat­ed as long ago as Decem­ber 2005.

MARCH 11, 2009: The Fed Did­n’t Cause the Hous­ing Bubble–by Alan Greenspan.

This one real­ly belongs in the “he would say that, would­n’t he?” bin.

We are in the midst of a glob­al cri­sis that will unques­tion­ably rank as the most vir­u­lent since the 1930s. It will even­tu­al­ly sub­side and pass into his­to­ry. But how the inter­act­ing and rein­forc­ing caus­es and effects of this severe con­trac­tion are inter­pret­ed will shape the recon­fig­u­ra­tion of our cur­rent­ly dis­abled glob­al finan­cial sys­tem…”

And if we fol­low Greenspan, we’ll once more give birth to the sev­en-head­ed Hydra of out of con­trol finance.

Here’s a sim­ple rule for politi­cians: read Greenspan’s advice, and then do the oppo­site.

Run of the Mill

May 9, 2009: Fed to the res­cue; How Ben Bernanke and his cen­tral bank head­ed off a depres­sion. Stu­art Wash­ing­ton, SMH.

In the world of finan­cial pain and recrim­i­na­tion after the pan­ic of 2008, it is easy to miss a cen­tral point: the US Fed­er­al Reserve has, so far, saved the Amer­i­can econ­o­my from a pre­cip­i­tous col­lapse.

May 8 2009: A glob­al tri­umph. Robert Got­tlieb­sen, Busi­ness Spec­ta­tor

The rise in the mar­kets in the past two months stemmed from the con­fi­dence that the glob­al bank­ing sys­tem would be saved. Now we have con­firmed that the task of sav­ing the sys­tem has been much eas­i­er than was orig­i­nal­ly expect­ed.

We can now declare that in all like­li­hood we have seen the bot­tom of the share mar­ket. We will have big share mar­ket cor­rec­tions along the way, but unless there is some dis­as­ter that is cur­rent­ly not on the hori­zon, the worst in the stock mar­ket is over.

We should con­grat­u­late the world lead­ers and cen­tral banks for the way they coop­er­at­ed after the Lehman crash. We had the lead­ers and cen­tral banks of US, Chi­na, con­ti­nen­tal Europe, Japan, Rus­sia and the UK all work­ing togeth­er to achieve a com­mon goal. It was unprece­dent­ed in glob­al his­to­ry and what they achieved was remark­able. I won­der if we could ever get them to do it again? The world would be a far bet­ter place if they kept doing it.

April 21, 2009: RBA sees revival on the way. Chris Zap­pone, SMH.

The Reserve Board con­ced­ed it under­es­ti­mat­ed the weak­ness of the econ­o­my but said a revival was on its way, prompt­ing some ana­lysts to pre­dict an end to rate reduc­tions.

”The effect of recent inter­na­tion­al and domes­tic infor­ma­tion had been that the near-term out­look for demand and out­put in Aus­tralia was now weak­er than ear­li­er expect­ed, though a recov­ery in demand was like­ly towards the end of the year,” the RBA said.

A Min­sky Melt­down: Lessons for Cen­tral Bankers. Pre­sen­ta­tion to the 18th Annu­al Hyman P. Min­sky Con­fer­ence on the State of the U.S. and World Economies—“Meeting the Chal­lenges of the Finan­cial Cri­sis”, Orga­nized by the Levy Eco­nom­ics Insti­tute of Bard Col­lege, New York City

By Janet L. Yellen, Pres­i­dent and CEO, Fed­er­al Reserve Bank of San Fran­cis­co

It’s a great plea­sure to speak to this dis­tin­guished group at a con­fer­ence named for Hyman P. Min­sky. My last talk here took place 13 years ago when I served on the Fed’s Board of Gov­er­nors. My top­ic then was “The ‘New’ Sci­ence of Cred­it Risk Man­age­ment at Finan­cial Insti­tu­tions.” It described inno­va­tions that I expect­ed to improve the mea­sure­ment and man­age­ment of risk. My talk today is titled “A Min­sky Melt­down: Lessons for Cen­tral Bankers.” I won’t dwell on the irony of that. Suf­fice it to say that, with the finan­cial world in tur­moil, Minsky’s work has become required read­ing. It is get­ting the recog­ni­tion it rich­ly deserves. The dra­mat­ic events of the past year and a half are a clas­sic case of the kind of sys­temic break­down that he—and rel­a­tive­ly few others—envisioned…

[What is a speech by a Fed­er­al Reserve Pres­i­dent eat­ing hum­ble pie, and eulo­gis­ing Min­sky, doing on the Brick­bats page? Because her under­stand­ing of Min­sky is so flawed. Read­ing this was rather like read­ing Hick­s’s “Mr Keynes and the Clas­sics” (1937), in which the deeply neo­clas­si­cal young John Hicks com­plete­ly man­gled Key­nes’s argu­ments in the Gen­er­al The­o­ry to argue that Keynes was com­pat­i­ble with neo­clas­si­cal thought:

Income and the rate of inter­st are now deter­mined togeth­er at P, the point of inter­sec­tion of the curves LL and IS. They are deter­mined togeth­er; just as price and out­put are deter­mined togeth­er in the mod­ern the­o­ry of demand and sup­ply. Indeed, Mr. Keynes’ inno­va­tion is close­ly par­al­lel, in this respect, to the inno­va­tion of the mar­gin­al­ists.” (p. 153)

Yellen did­n’t claim any­thing quite as brazen as this, but her unin­ten­tion­al emas­cu­la­tion of Min­sky’s argu­ment was, to me breath­tak­ing.

April 17, 2009: More US eco­nom­ic hope.

Claims for US unem­ploy­ment insur­ance unex­pect­ed­ly dropped last week and sin­gle-fam­i­ly hous­ing starts sta­bi­lized in March, pro­vid­ing more evi­dence the eco­nom­ic slump is eas­ing.

Ini­tial job­less claims decreased by 53,000 to 610,000 in the week end­ed April 11, the fewest since Jan­u­ary, the Labor Depart­ment said today in Wash­ing­ton. Builders broke ground on 358,000 sin­gle-fam­i­ly homes at an annu­al rate, unchanged from the pri­or month.

There’s a real pos­si­bil­i­ty this could be a turn­ing point,” said James O’Sul­li­van, senior econ­o­mist at UBS Secu­ri­ties LLC in Stam­ford, Con­necti­cut. “We’ve seen some fad­ing of weak­ness in con­sumer spend­ing. The log­i­cal next step would be some fad­ing of weak­ness in the labor mar­ket.”

April 12, 2009: Signs of hope for econ­o­my: Oba­ma.

UNITED STATES Pres­i­dent Barack Oba­ma has tak­en a cal­cu­lat­ed risk by pre­dict­ing the US may be begin­ning to rise out of reces­sion, say­ing that he saw “glim­mers of hope” across the econ­o­my…

What we’re start­ing to see is glim­mers of hope across the econ­o­my,” Mr Oba­ma said at the White House after get­ting an update on the econ­o­my from US Fed­er­al Reserve chair­man Ben Bernanke, trea­sury sec­re­tary Tim­o­thy Gei­th­n­er, and Sheila Bair, the chair­woman of the Fed­er­al Deposit Insur­ance Cor­po­ra­tion.

But that phrase could come back to haunt him if the reces­sion turns out to be pro­longed. It will be used over and over again by the Repub­li­cans in next year’s mid-term con­gres­sion­al elec­tions if unem­ploy­ment rates are still high and the econ­o­my is still bogged down.

April 11, 2009: Oba­ma advis­er has end in sight.

AMERICANS will begin to feel like they are recov­er­ing from the eco­nom­ic down­turn with­in a few months, a top US econ­o­mist says.

Lawrence Sum­mers, direc­tor of the Nation­al Eco­nom­ic Coun­cil and the clos­est eco­nom­ic aide to the US Pres­i­dent, Barack Oba­ma, said his aim was to ensure that the down­turn did not become a his­toric event.

Speak­ing at the Eco­nom­ic Club of Wash­ing­ton on Thurs­day, he likened the state of the econ­o­my to a ball falling off a table with no end in sight and said that, despite per­sis­tent down­drafts, with­in months “we will no longer have that sense of free fall”.

The assess­ment is one of the most buoy­ant from any­one con­nect­ed with the Oba­ma Admin­is­tra­tion since it took office in Jan­u­ary, and was tak­en by some as a sign that the US econ­o­my had already reached its nadir.

But the view­point is at odds with that of the per­ma­nent staff of the Fed­er­al Reserve, which on Wednes­day cut growth fore­casts, say­ing pro­duc­tiv­i­ty would flat­ten in the sec­ond half of this year and turn slow­ly to expan­sion in 2010.

April 09 2009: War­wick McK­ib­bin joins The 7.30 Report.

KERRY O’BRIEN, PRESENTER: For­mer Reserve Bank econ­o­mist and now Reserve Bank board mem­ber War­wick McK­ib­bin is one of the Aus­trali­a’s most high­ly cre­den­tialed econ­o­mists. He’s direc­tor of the Cen­tre of Applied Macro-eco­nom­ic Analy­sis at ANU, a senior fel­low at the Lowy Insti­tute and has racked up a string of inter­na­tion­al posts as well…

KERRY O’BRIEN: War­wick McK­ib­bin, are you, in the end, on opti­mist more than a pes­simist right now?

WARWICK MCKIBBIN: Well I am opti­mistic. I can see green shoots of recov­ery. If you just look at the sta­tis­tics, you can see that the US should by now be start­ing to come out of the dynam­ic adjust­ment path to a stan­dard reces­sion. They do have asset over­hang prob­lems. They have some very impor­tant deci­sions to make over the next few months. But I see the US enter­ing a recov­ery phase and I’m very opti­mistic in what’s hap­pen­ing in Chi­na and India and the devel­op­ing world. So on a bal­ance, I’m an opti­mist, but in this envi­ron­ment, some bad news can be dev­as­tat­ing­ly bad. And that’s what con­cerns me, is that we just don’t know com­plete­ly that this is over.

April 09, 2009: Val­ues more like­ly to rise, con­trary to warn­ings. HOTSPOTTING: Ter­ry Ryder, The Aus­tralian

THE only func­tion of eco­nom­ic fore­cast­ing, econ­o­mist J.K Gal­braith said, is to make astrol­o­gy look respectable.

Right now in Aus­tralia, astrol­o­gy is look­ing very respectable indeed as a gag­gle of pub­lic­i­ty-hun­gry econ­o­mists pre­dict dire out­comes which are lat­er con­tra­dict­ed by actu­al events…

Each new data release from the Bureau of Sta­tis­tics is greet­ed with a cho­rus of sur­prise from econ­o­mists who expect­ed less pos­i­tive results. [This was pub­lished the day unem­ploy­ment rose 2.5 times as much as mar­ket econ­o­mists had antic­i­pat­ed]

But, in the spir­it of “if we’re going to get it wrong, we might as well get it wrong about every­thing”, a small num­ber of noisy econ­o­mists have been pre­dict­ing dec­i­ma­tion of home val­ues. They’ve received undue atten­tion from some sec­tions of the media which haven’t both­ered to ques­tion whether the fore­cast­ers have any cre­den­tials to be pon­tif­i­cat­ing about prop­er­ty. The title “econ­o­mist” is deemed suf­fi­cient. None of those pre­dict­ing an implo­sion of val­ues are prop­er­ty ana­lysts…

With improved afford­abil­i­ty, low inter­est rates, high lev­els of gov­ern­ment incen­tives, the low­er end of the mar­ket is buzzing.

That will pro­duce price growth, or at least price sta­bil­i­ty, in con­trast to those sad pre­dic­tions of big decreas­es.

April 3, 2009: Dol­lar soars to three-month high.

Kinet­ic Secu­ri­ties chief econ­o­mist Clif­ford Ben­net said the Aus­tralian dol­lar had a “great ral­ly” and was expect­ed to build on its gains.

Our medi­um term tar­get remains 79 US cents,” he said.

We have had 69 and 79 US cent tar­gets all year on the expec­ta­tion of the world econ­o­my doing bet­ter than con­sen­sus expec­ta­tions and Aus­tralia hav­ing a momen­tary reces­sion only.”

Bank of New Zealand cur­ren­cy strate­gist Dan­i­ca Hamp­ton said on Fri­day that finan­cial mar­kets were upbeat about the steps announced in Lon­don.

The idea that the world is on the road to recov­ery and per­haps we are going to pull out of this quick­er than expect­ed has real­ly encour­aged demand for growth-sen­si­tive cur­ren­cies like the Aus­tralian dol­lar,” she said.

April 03, 2009: Hous­ing dam­age won’t be dras­tic. Alan Wood, The Aus­tralian.

In the US and Britain, (nom­i­nal) home prices already have fall­en by more than 20 per cent. The Stan­dard &Poor’s/Case-Shiller index for 10 lead­ing US cities is down 30 per cent from its 2006 peak and the 20-city index is down 29 per cent.

Noth­ing like this has hap­pened in Aus­tralia, nor is it like­ly to…

Does this mean the fall in hous­ing prices is already over and from here on prices will rise? That looks like too opti­mistic an expec­ta­tion, giv­en the sever­i­ty of glob­al reces­sion. But, as with the Aus­tralian econ­o­my over­all, there are good rea­sons to expect our hous­ing mar­ket will stay in much bet­ter shape than hous­ing mar­kets in the US, Britain, Europe and Japan.

Now, of course, we have the worst glob­al reces­sion since the ’30s and an inter­na­tion­al cred­it cri­sis, but an author­i­ta­tive analy­sis last week by Antho­ny Richards, the Reserve Bank of Aus­trali­a’s res­i­dent hous­ing expert, high­lights sev­er­al impor­tant rea­sons for expect­ing Aus­tralian hous­ing prices to per­form bet­ter than in many oth­er coun­tries…

March 31, 2009: Your house is safe, RBA says. Chris Zap­pone, SMH.

Aus­trali­a’s house prices will hold up bet­ter than those over­seas, despite the slump­ing econ­o­my, the Reserve Bank said, large­ly because of the qual­i­ty of the loans under­pin­ning the mar­ket.

We con­tin­ue to believe that the mar­ket here will hold up bet­ter than over­seas,” RBA deputy gov­er­nor Ric Bat­telli­no said in a speech to the Urban Devel­op­ment Insti­tute of Aus­tralia in Bris­bane.

March 24, 2009: First-home grant should be free loan. Christo­pher Joye in The Aus­tralian. In a first, I’m post­ing this on both the Brick­bats & Gems pages–the for­mer because it does take a swipe at me, the lat­ter because Chris pro­pos­es a “mid­dle way” that is quite pos­si­bly what the Gov­ern­ment will go for.

Aus­tralia also has incred­i­bly low long-term mort­gage default rates, only 0.4per cent of all loans, despite hefty recent mort­gage costs (US rates are 6.25 times high­er). Banks have tight­ened lend­ing stan­dards since the cri­sis began and apply their harsh­est rules to first-time buy­ers. The pres­sure on house­holds to delever­age has plum­met­ed as mort­gage rates have been cut by 40 per cent to 38-year lows and the ratio of house­hold inter­est pay­ments to dis­pos­able income has dropped from 15 to 10per cent. Final­ly, Keen offers no analy­sis of how debt lev­els, ser­vice­abil­i­ty (fine), default rates (low) and house prices (hard­ly changed) all inter­re­late.

One solu­tion is to con­vert the grant into an inter­est-free loan. Rather than tax­pay­ers mak­ing a gift to every new own­er, the sub­sidy could be adjust­ed into a loan that would be repaid when the prop­er­ty is sold. This is sim­i­lar to the way the High­er Edu­ca­tion Con­tri­bu­tion Scheme works for high­er edu­ca­tion. A bet­ter solu­tion would be to index the loan to the less­er of infla­tion and the home­’s cap­i­tal gains, ensur­ing tax­pay­ers avoid real loss­es.

MARCH 11, 2009: The Fed Did­n’t Cause the Hous­ing Bubble–by Alan Greenspan.

This one real­ly belongs in the “he would say that, would­n’t he?” bin.

We are in the midst of a glob­al cri­sis that will unques­tion­ably rank as the most vir­u­lent since the 1930s. It will even­tu­al­ly sub­side and pass into his­to­ry. But how the inter­act­ing and rein­forc­ing caus­es and effects of this severe con­trac­tion are inter­pret­ed will shape the recon­fig­u­ra­tion of our cur­rent­ly dis­abled glob­al finan­cial sys­tem…”

And if we fol­low Greenspan, we’ll once more give birth to the sev­en-head­ed Hydra of out of con­trol finance.

Here’s a sim­ple rule for politi­cians: read Greenspan’s advice, and then do the oppo­site.

Feb­ru­ary 21: Michael Duffy, SMHThe rub­bish PMs love to ped­dle. Fre­quent­ly I find Michael Duffy’s con­ser­v­a­tive scep­ti­cism a good com­bi­na­tion, but there’s no scep­ti­cism here in how he assess­es our recent eco­nom­ic past.

We face the melan­choly prospect that Aus­trali­a’s most recent three gov­ern­ments will come to resem­ble in their effects on the econ­o­my the pat­tern of rise and fall seen in some wealthy fam­i­lies. The first gen­er­a­tion (Hawke-Keat­ing) estab­lish­es the for­tune. The sec­ond (Howard) con­sol­i­dates it. And the third piss­es it up against the wall.”

Feb­ru­ary 20 2009: RBA Gov­er­nor Glenn Stevens is cur­rent­ly in the hot seat, fac­ing a Par­lia­men­tary Com­mit­tee at a reg­u­lar twice a year brief­ing.

Six months ago, he had sat in front of the Com­mit­tee defend­ing an inter­est rate hik­ing pro­gram that had pushed the cash rate from a low of 4.25% in 2001 to a high of 7.25% (includ­ing one famous and unprece­dent­ed rate hike dur­ing the 2007 elec­tion cam­paign), but which had just gone into mild reverse with a 0.25% cut days before he front­ed the Com­mit­tee. Today, he has to explain why the RBA was caught so unawares by the direc­tion the world econ­o­my moved in, and why infla­tion tar­get­ting has gone out the win­dow as the rate has been cut by 4% in five months to a decades-low lev­el of 3.25%. Here is hisopen­ing address to the Com­mit­tee, with his speech­es in Sep­tem­ber 2008 and April 2008 for com­par­i­son. Let’s hope the ques­tion­ing reflects the seri­ous­ness of the change in events, and the whys and where­for­es of the RBA’s fail­ure to see what con­trar­i­ans like myself antic­i­pat­ed as long ago as Decem­ber 2005.

Feb­ru­ary 20: John Howard, Five great reforms are an essen­tial lega­cy.

The lega­cy of the for­mer Lib­er­al gov­ern­ment is one that we should all want to own. Aus­tralia was a stronger, proud­er and more pros­per­ous nation in Novem­ber 2007 than it had been in March 1996. Yet attempts have been made to dis­count the con­tri­bu­tions of com­pet­i­tive cap­i­tal­ism and more open mar­kets to the remark­able eco­nom­ic growth, in many nations, dur­ing these past 30 years.

Eco­nom­ic change of the type Aus­tralia expe­ri­enced over this time has been exten­sive and, to many, unset­tling but it has been accept­ed as nec­es­sary.

In 1980 our nation need­ed five great reforms. We need­ed to dereg­u­late our finan­cial sys­tem, fun­da­men­tal­ly change our tax­a­tion sys­tem, make our labour mar­kets freer, reduce exces­sive­ly high tar­iffs and rid the gov­ern­ment of own­er­ship of com­mer­cial enter­pris­es that would be bet­ter run pri­vate­ly. By 2007 these five great reforms had been achieved.

Those five reforms were an essen­tial Aus­tralian con­tri­bu­tion to what one might prop­er­ly describe as the neo-lib­er­al exper­i­ment of the past 30 years.

Neo­clas­si­cal econ­o­mists like War­wick McK­ib­bin (Pro­fes­sor of Eco­nom­ics, ANU ) and Peter Swan (Pro­fes­sor of Finance, UNSW) are final­ly putting their igno­rance in print–see espe­cial­ly the bits I have put in bold. I hope Kevin Rudd and Wayne Swan are read­ing this stuff care­ful­ly, and jus­ti­fi­ably shak­ing their heads.

Feb­ru­ary 6: Mark Davis, SMH. Reserve bank direc­tor oppos­es pack­age.

A RESERVE Bank board mem­ber has expressed con­cern about the size of the Fed­er­al Gov­ern­men­t’s $42 bil­lion fis­cal stim­u­lus pack­age and cast doubt on whether its planned cash pay­ments to mil­lions of Aus­tralians would be effec­tive in stim­u­lat­ing spend­ing in the econ­o­my.

Pro­fes­sor War­wick McK­ib­bin also accused the Gov­ern­ment of play­ing pol­i­tics with the eco­nom­ic slow­down and warned that this could shat­ter frag­ile con­sumer and busi­ness con­fi­dence.

It risks turn­ing what isn’t a cri­sis into a cri­sis,” he told the Her­ald yes­ter­day.

Pro­fes­sor McK­ib­bin, a promi­nent econ­o­mist from the Aus­tralian Nation­al Uni­ver­si­ty, is one of six non-exec­u­tive direc­tors who sit on the RBA board with the cen­tral bank’s senior exec­u­tives and Trea­sury sec­re­tary Ken Hen­ry.

If it is a cri­sis — and I am not sure we are in a cri­sis — that sug­gests mak­ing the cash hand­outs even big­ger will be prob­lem­at­ic.”

Feb­ru­ary 6: Peter Swan, SMH. Rud­d’s pud­ding much too sweet. “But short-term hand­outs are a flash in the pan with­out last­ing ben­e­fit. They are, like the ear­li­er $10 bil­lion give­away that cre­at­ed a tem­po­rary Christ­mas blip, the cen­tre­piece of the Rudd Plan. And they should have no place in a sen­si­ble pack­age based on neo­clas­si­cal growth the­o­ry to build long-term sus­tain­able wealth.”

Feb­ru­ary 5: Mal­com Turn­bull. Rud­d’s splurge is too much too soon. “The Coali­tion will vote against the Rudd Gov­ern­men­t’s lat­est $42 bil­lion expen­di­ture pack­age because it is poor­ly tar­get­ed and unnec­es­sar­i­ly large.”

Jan­u­ary 31: World can learn from us: Gillard, SMH. In two years time, I think Julia will file this in her “wish­ful think­ing” fold­er:

Aus­tralian reg­u­la­tions for banks and finan­cial insti­tu­tions could help shape tough new rules to police the glob­al econ­o­my, Deputy Prime Min­is­ter Julia Gillard says… Gillard, who is at the WEF, said she believed coun­tries could learn from Aus­trali­a’s reg­u­la­tions which she described as being among the best in the world and had stopped the coun­try expe­ri­enc­ing the kind of prob­lems in its hous­ing mar­ket that had been seen in the US.”

Adam Carr, senior econ­o­mist at ICAP Aus­tralia, Busi­ness Spec­ta­tor. MAKE AUSTRALIA WORK: For­get the defla­tion bogey­man.  I expect this argu­ment will prove to be an excel­lent exam­ple of the propo­si­tion that there is noth­ing more dan­ger­ous than a bad theory–and that peo­ple who have a bad the­o­ry, a.k.a. econ­o­mists who believe in “neo­clas­si­cal eco­nom­ics”, helped cause this cri­sis and then have no idea of its sever­i­ty, or how to fight it. My next Debt­watch will argue that call­ing our finan­cial sys­tem a “fiat cur­ren­cy” one is akin to the para­ble of the blind man decid­ing that an ele­phant was a snake when he felt its trunk.

Fatal­ists will pipe up that the world is lit­tered with defla­tion­ary episodes and that, indeed, is the truth. For instance, dur­ing much of the 19th cen­tu­ry many nations expe­ri­enced defla­tion­ary peri­ods and pri­or to that, his­to­ry shows that prices were just as like­ly to increase as decrease. Yet there is one fun­da­men­tal dif­fer­ence between those peri­ods and now – mon­ey isn’t backed by any­thing, such as gold or what have you. In oth­er words, mon­ey has no intrin­sic val­ue and this is called a fiat cur­ren­cy sys­tem.

In this cur­rent cri­sis, if the US mon­e­tary base was shrink­ing and the Fed was doing noth­ing about it, then defla­tion may have some cred­i­bil­i­ty. Yet the Fed isn’t doing noth­ing – inter­est rates are at zero and ‘cred­it eas­ing’ is in vogue. The US mon­e­tary base has con­se­quent­ly expand­ed at its fastest pace in mod­ern eco­nom­ic his­to­ry.

That being the case, it seems to me that the great­est error the RBA could make right now would be to cut too aggres­sive­ly and so be ill-pre­pared should the econ­o­my (glob­al and domes­tic) turn out to be stronger than every­one is fore­cast­ing.

Think back to the con­ver­sa­tions we were all hav­ing this time last year. Every­one was fore­cast­ing a stronger-for-ever Chi­nese growth cycle and per­ma­nent infla­tion pres­sures. That con­sen­sus was wrong last year and while things are very uncer­tain now, it’s not beyond the realm of pos­si­bil­i­ty that the con­sen­sus is wrong again. The con­se­quences of this are very seri­ous and would neces­si­tate a desta­bil­is­ing series of rate hikes as the pen­du­lum again swung to infla­tion hys­te­ria.

Jan­u­ary 28: Ross Git­tins, SMH. No good rea­son to feel depres­sion.

But no mat­ter how bad this reces­sion proves to be, it’s a safe pre­dic­tion it won’t be near­ly as bad as the Depres­sion, when the rate of unem­ploy­ment leapt to more than 20 per cent. So don’t let the talk of depres­sion spook you…

And con­sid­er this: were the rate of unem­ploy­ment to more than dou­ble to 10 per cent, that would still mean 90 per cent of work­ers had kept their jobs…

I pre­dict that, before the year’s out, we’ll see let­ters to the edi­tor pro­claim­ing: What reces­sion? My local restau­rant is still full on Sat­ur­day nights. Why am I sure we’ll see this? Because I hear peo­ple say­ing it in every reces­sion…

Remem­ber, too, that con­trary to what we first think, the eco­nom­ic news is nev­er all good or all bad…”

Jan­u­ary 22: Michael Pas­coe, SMH: Ah, so that’s unem­ploy­ment. “Oh My Gosh! Com­pa­nies are lay­ing off work­ers! So that must be what they meant when they said the unem­ploy­ment rate would rise…For the indi­vid­u­als whose lives are turned upside down by sud­den­ly being sacked, these are indeed wor­ry­ing and stress­ful times. For the peo­ple who own busi­ness­es that are going broke, wip­ing out their sav­ings in the process, it’s worse again. But for the econ­o­my as a whole, the glass isn’t even down to the half emp­ty lev­el.”

19 JANUARY: Bernard Keane, Crikey:  The ped­dlers of reces­sion p‑rn. “Steve Keen has com­plained in Crikey of being treat­ed as an Eey­ore, but real­ly he is more a Bib­li­cal fig­ure than a res­i­dent of the Hun­dred Acre Wood, hav­ing warned for years about the dan­gers of debt with the fer­vour of an Old Tes­ta­ment prophet. Every new piece of bad news is, for Keen, who last week upgrad­ed his pre­dic­tions of doom to “worse than the Great Depres­sion”, evi­dence that he was right and the rest of us sin­ners, who have refused to repent of our debt-laden ways, wrong.”

7 Jan 2009: Christo­pher Joye, CONCRETE DETAIL, Busi­ness Spec­ta­tor: “In one of his recent notes, Mr Robert­son com­ments: “The house­hold sec­tor’s debt-ser­vic­ing ratio is in the process of drop­ping from about 14 per cent to about 10 per cent of dis­pos­able income. Yes, job cuts are com­ing, but the pres­sure for Aus­tralia house­hold sec­tor as a whole to “delever­age” actu­al­ly is falling, not ris­ing… The ear­ly signs are that Dr Keen will turn out to be quite wrong.” ”

Jan­u­ary 2, 2009: Mark Davis, SMH: Give your pay pack­et a shave and help save jobs.

Here it is. When I saw this cri­sis was immi­nent in Decem­ber 2005, one major fac­tor that moti­vat­ed me to go pub­lic with my analy­sis was the cer­tain­ty that, when the cri­sis hit, econ­o­mists would either blame it on wages being too high (“the abo­li­tion of Work Choic­es caused the Depres­sion!”) or would sug­gest that wages should be cut to reduce the imbal­ance between the sup­ply of and demand for labour.

The cri­sis hit too ear­ly and was far too glob­al for the abo­li­tion of Work Choic­es to cop it sweet, but here we have “Eco­nom­ic mod­ellers” telling us that a 1% cut in wages will boost employ­ment growth by half a per­cent…

I have writ­ten a Let­ter to the Edi­tor about this piece of non­sense; I expect to see it pub­lished tomor­row. After that, I’ll put a blog entry up on this one:

the Gov­ern­ment … should revive the long-dor­mant instru­ment of wages policy…Wages have been grow­ing by 4 per cent a year as employ­ees chase ris­ing prices and employ­ers face short­ages of skilled work­ers. But with the econ­o­my turn­ing, the old adage that one work­er’s pay rise is anoth­er’s job will come into play again… the Fair Pay Com­mis­sion chair­man, Ian Harp­er, would have to award a par­si­mo­nious min­i­mum wage increase of $12 a week as opposed to last year’s $22 increase…

The next step would be for employ­ers and employ­ees with col­lec­tive or indi­vid­ual wage deals up for nego­ti­a­tion this year to accept pay ris­es of 3 per cent or less.

Eco­nom­ic mod­ellers reck­on cut­ting aggre­gate wages growth by a per­cent­age point boosts employ­ment growth by half a per­cent­age point. Some think it boosts employ­ment more. In the cur­rent envi­ron­ment that could save more than 50,000 jobs.

Ear­ly and deci­sive lead­er­ship is need­ed.

The only thing that should be done “Ear­ly and deci­sive­ly” is that all neo­clas­si­cal econ­o­mists should be sent to train­ing camps where they would be com­pelled to read Min­sky, Keynes, Schum­peter and the like (includ­ing Marx), and to attend lec­tures on dynam­ic mod­el­ling by engi­neers.

Decem­ber 30: Christo­pher Joye, Busi­ness Spec­ta­tor: The great house price myth.

Yet the medi­an Aus­tralian home, worth just over $400,000, has been extra­or­di­nar­i­ly resilient falling by lit­tle more than 1 per cent. It is, there­fore, high­ly mis­lead­ing to pre­sume that the expe­ri­ence of upper income house­holds can be applied to the aver­age Aus­tralian home own­er as is the media’s wont. While ris­ing unem­ploy­ment will inevitably put fur­ther pres­sure on prices, this will be coun­ter­bal­anced by 30–50 per cent reduc­tions in mort­gage rates com­bined with the government’s com­mit­ment to sup­port house­holds via greater fis­cal stim­u­lus. Australia’s media also needs to come to the par­ty by spend­ing less time fuelling con­sumer fears with sen­sa­tion­al­ist head­lines and invest­ing more effort objec­tive­ly analysing the data.

The $3.3 tril­lion hous­ing mar­ket is sim­ply too big a top­ic to get wrong…”

Decem­ber 28: The hard times aren’t over yet: Fuel, rent, pow­er bills up next year, SMH. The post itself is just a news piece, but this pre­dic­tion from Comm­sec’s econ­o­mist Craig James is worth pre­serv­ing for pos­ter­i­ty:

Comm­Sec econ­o­mist Craig James said the econ­o­my would emerge from the glob­al slow­down in the mid­dle of next year, dri­ven by high­er con­struc­tion. He said inter­est-rate cuts and first-home buy­er grants would cause house prices to rise 5 per cent, and the Fed­er­al Gov­ern­men­t’s infra­struc­ture pro­gram and grants to coun­cils would dri­ve work on roads, rail­ways, hos­pi­tals and schools.

Mr James esti­mat­ed the cash rate would fall from 4.25 per cent to 3.25 per cent by June, bring­ing more good news to home own­ers whose loans had vari­able inter­est rates. But he said if the econ­o­my per­formed well, inter­est rates might rise again.

The Reserve Bank will start mak­ing nois­es mid-year about lift­ing inter­est rates, giv­en the strength in our domes­tic econ­o­my and improve­ments in economies over­seas,” he said.

Decem­ber 4th: Lessons from the nation­al accounts, The Aus­tralian Edi­to­r­i­al. “Eco­nom­ics is an inex­act sci­ence, but today’s sophis­ti­cat­ed tech­niques for mon­i­tor­ing per­for­mance and the close inter­ac­tion between coun­tries help author­i­ties avoid the mis­takes of the Great Depres­sion… Such an assess­ment has lit­tle in com­mon with the views of dooms­day uber-bear econ­o­mists [No argu­ment with that!–SK] such as the Uni­ver­si­ty of West­ern Syd­ney’s asso­ciate pro­fes­sor of eco­nom­ics and finance, Steve Keen, whose fre­quent appear­ances on the ABC and else­where have made him a kind of ubiq­ui­tous Eye­o­re”.

Decem­ber 4th: Christo­pher Joye, Real estate’s tem­ple of doom, The Aus­tralian. “Keen likes to shock by quot­ing sta­tis­tics about the rise in house­hold debt with­out acknowl­edg­ing that debt-ser­vic­ing ratios have remained unchanged thanks to vast­ly low­er real inter­est rates, the emer­gence of two-income house­holds and high­er real incomes.”

Decem­ber 3rd: Mal­colm Maid­en, The bot­tom of the inter­est rate bar­rel is a long way off, SMH

Novem­ber 28th: Bloomberg, ‘Rate Cut’ Rory Bets Aus­trali­a’s High­est Peak on House Prices

Novem­ber 26 2008: Ross Git­tins Hous­ing heads for a soft land­ing, SMH

Novem­ber 24 2008: Git­tins “What­ev­er lies ahead won’t be near­ly bad enough to be com­pared with the Depres­sion”

Novem­ber 16 2008: Howard’s “stop com­par­ing what we now face to the Great Depres­sion” com­ments, SMH

Ger­ard Hen­der­son, SMH, Octo­ber 21 2008. Doom­say­er gets instant fame.

Hen­der­son isn’t an econ­o­mist, but he takes the prize for the most promi­nent and vit­ri­olic spray to date.

Michael Pas­coe, Crikey, Octo­ber 23: Econ­o­mists lin­ing up to dis­agree with Steve Keen

Chris Richard­son, Access Eco­nom­ics, report­ed in The Age, Octo­ber 23: “Keen on gloom

Ter­ry McCrann, The Her­ald Sun, Octo­ber 16: More bad home-buy­ing behav­iour

That’s it for now; I know I’ve missed quite a few though. If you know of any par­tic­u­lar­ly notable brick­bats that I’ve missed, please email them to me and I’ll post them here.