Always look on the bright side of … economic data?

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If things are real­ly grim, it helps to have an inde­fati­ga­ble nature, and there’s no doubt that RBA Deputy Gov­er­nor Ric Bat­telli­no has that in spades—at least in the speech­es he makes at pub­lic con­fer­ences. Were I being cru­ci­fied, I’d like to have Ric up there with me, singing “Cheer up Bri­an!…”, to take my mind off the nails.

But were I still in the Gar­den of Geth­se­mane, and actu­al­ly try­ing to avoid the Romans (and an extend­ed Pilates ses­sion the next day), I think I’d want some­one else on look­out duty.

Reality Bites in Australia’s Savage Rate Cut

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Yes­ter­day the RBA (Aus­trali­a’s Cen­tral Bank) cut its reserve rate by three quar­ters of a per­cent, to 5.25 per­cent. This is the third cut in 3 months, bring­ing the cumu­la­tive reduc­tion since Sep­tem­ber to 2 per­cent

This is a far cry from the RBA’s expec­ta­tions in 2007, that in 2008 it would be rais­ing rates to con­strain a boom­ing econ­o­my and bring infla­tion back down to its tar­get range.

Infla­tion is still above its tar­get, but clear­ly that’s a bulls eye the RBA is no longer aim­ing for. What on earth went wrong with the RBA’s pre­dic­tions for 2008?

DebtWatch No 28 November 2008: What is Really Going On?

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2nd Anniver­sary Issue…

Why Did I See it Coming and “They” Didn’t?

The finan­cial cri­sis is wide­ly accept­ed as hav­ing start­ed in August 9 2007, with the BNP’s announce­ment that it was sus­pend­ing redemp­tions from three of its funds that were heav­i­ly exposed to the US secu­ri­ti­sa­tion mar­ket (click here for the BNP August 9 2007 press release).

Just three months before­hand, the OECD released its 2007 World Eco­nom­ic Out­look, in which it com­ment­ed that:

Financial Hocus-Pocus? From managed fund to bank?

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The sug­ges­tion that the Fed­er­al Gov­ern­ment might extend its guar­an­tee to man­aged funds in return for the funds becom­ing banks is, as Glenn Dyer has observed for Crikey, sheer bunkum.

On the lender side, this sec­tor of the finance indus­try large­ly arose to make mon­ey out of lend­ing prac­tices or finan­cial prod­ucts that were too adven­tur­ous for banks them­selves.

On the “depos­i­tor” side, investors in these com­pa­nies knew full well that they weren’t mak­ing deposits that can be with­drawn at call—as with a bank—but invest­ments.

I couldn’t have put it better myself

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There’s an excel­lent arti­cle in The Age today on the mad meth­ods of neo­clas­si­cal econ­o­mists. The author is Mar­tin Feil, who was once a direc­tor of the Indus­tries Assis­tance Commission–a pre­vi­ous incar­na­tion of what is now called the Pro­duc­tiv­i­ty Com­mis­sion:

The arti­cle is enti­tled We can’t live on moon­beams and air.

I plan to tack­le sim­i­lar issues in my next two Debt­watch Reports. Novem­ber’s (the 28th, which is also the sec­ond anniver­sary issue–I start­ed the report in Novem­ber 2006) focus­es on the data that neo­clas­si­cal the­o­ry directs the atten­tion of econ­o­mists to, and the data that the the­o­ry caus­es them to ignore. Cru­cial­ly, the lat­ter includes pri­vate debt–and Feil makes a sim­i­lar set of obser­va­tions. On the data that the RBA’s neo­clas­si­cal econ­o­mists con­sid­er impor­tant:

Play the ball and not the man

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The import of Ger­ard Hen­der­son­’s dia­tribe in today’s SMH is that the media has done a “soft” job on  my views, which have only gained noto­ri­ety because of the extreme pre­dic­tion I have made—about the forth­com­ing eco­nom­ic down­turn qual­i­fy­ing as not mere­ly a reces­sion, but a Depres­sion. It seems I’ve only got atten­tion because of my extreme views, while the media has let the side down by doing a “tabloid” job only and not sub­ject­ing my views to scruti­ny.

Rescuing the Economy or the Bubble?

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Many ele­ments of the recent­ly announced pack­age are jus­ti­fied. When the econ­o­my is about to go into a debt-induced reces­sion, gov­ern­ment spend­ing both boosts demand, and pro­vides the pri­vate sec­tor with cash flow need­ed to meet its debt repay­ment com­mit­ments.

Equal­ly vital was the guar­an­tee of all bank deposits. A run on the banks would be dis­as­trous, and this guar­an­tee ensures that this will not hap­pen.

The Panic of 2008

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This week, finan­cial mar­kets tru­ly suc­cumbed to The Pan­ic. The US Dow Jones and S&P500 Indices lost 21%; Aus­trali­a’s All Ordi­nar­ies fell 16%. “Buy and Hold” gave way to “Get Out At All Costs”.

When we look back with the eyes of his­to­ry, the ninth day of the tenth month of 2008 will be the Black Thurs­day on which the world’s biggest ever spec­u­la­tive bub­ble final­ly burst.

The Stock Market Crash of 2008

The Stock Mar­ket Crash of 2008

Debtwatch 27 October 08: The Failure of Central Banks

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Just two years ago, Cen­tral Banks appeared tri­umphant. Infla­tion, the scourge of the 1970s and 80s, appeared dead, the finan­cial cri­sis of the Tech Wreck had been con­tained, economies world­wide were boom­ing, and stock mar­kets and house prices were spi­ralling ever upwards.

Then along came the Sub­prime Cri­sis, and we received a rude reminder of why Cen­tral Banks were cre­at­ed in the first place: to ensure that the world would nev­er again expe­ri­ence a Great Depres­sion.