I met with Yves Smith of Naked Cap­i­tal­ism on the week­end, at a superb Japan­ese restau­rant that only New York locals could find (and I’ll keep its loca­tion qui­et for their benefit–too much pub­lic­i­ty could spoil a spec­tac­u­lar thing). Yves was kind enough to post details of my lat­est aca­d­e­m­ic paper at her site in a post she enti­tled “Steve Keen’s scary Min­sky mod­el”.

Yves found the mod­el scary, not because it revealed any­thing about the econ­o­my that she did­n’t already know, but because it so eas­i­ly repro­duced the Ponzi fea­tures of the econ­o­my she knows so well.

If you’ve down­loaded and read the paper and pre­sen­ta­tion I post­ed in my pre­vi­ous entry, then there’s noth­ing new for you to read in the body of this post; the main addi­tion is the video below of my talk.

| Open Play­er in New Win­dow

That in part gives you rather too good a view of the back of the heads of Randy Wray and Dim­it­ry Papadim­itri­ou, both of whom sat down in front of the cam­era after my talk began, but the slides are still eas­i­ly vis­i­ble.

This is just a very quick post to make my paper at the Levy Insti­tute avail­able. Lat­er I’ll add a post of the paper itself and a video of the pre­sen­ta­tion.

One of the unex­pect­ed things I’ve learnt in Boston is that the Glob­al Finan­cial Cri­sis is not called the Glob­al Finan­cial Cri­sis in America–and there­fore the TLA of the GFC has no mean­ing here.

Instead, in Amer­i­ca this might be The Cri­sis That Has No Name (TCTHNN), because they don’t call it any­thing at all: it’s just how the econ­o­my is right now.

Aus­tralians, it seems, are the ones who invent­ed the moniker GFC as a way of describ­ing what they think they don’t have to under­stand. Over here, where it is actu­al­ly hap­pen­ing, it is just the day to day real­i­ty that must be con­tend­ed with.

A blog mem­ber has arranged for me to give a talk dur­ing my trip to NY.  I will cov­er the caus­es of the glob­al finan­cial cri­sis, the pol­i­cy response thus far, and the out­look for the world econ­o­my, with a focus on the US and Aus­tralia.

LOCATION: ‘In Good Com­pa­ny’ work­places, 4th floor of 16 West 23rd Street in Man­hat­tan.  Google Maps link.

DATE & TIME: Wednes­day 7th July, from 6–9pm

AVAILABILITY: the space has capac­i­ty for 20 peo­ple, so please con­firm your atten­dance ASAP so spaces can be offered to oth­ers who may be inter­est­ed in attend­ing.

Unex­pect­ed and won­der­ful things can hap­pen when you stick your neck out, as I have done over Aus­trali­a’s pri­vate debt bub­ble. The “tall pop­py” syn­drome can still cut you down, but you also find that peo­ple are will­ing to assist in ways that you’d nev­er think of your­self.

One of those has just occurred with respect to the Keen Walk to Kosciuszko, where out of the blue Noel Almei­da has pre­pared a com­mem­o­ra­tive envelope–the sales of which will raise mon­ey for Swags for Home­less. Here is a sam­ple:

Noel has made a mere 23 for sale, and he describes the prod­uct in the fol­low­ing way:

Jere­my Grantham pricked, if not the hous­ing bub­ble itself, then at least the bub­ble that prop­er­ty mar­ket spruik­ers live in, with the quip that:

“Bub­bles have quite a few things in com­mon but hous­ing bub­bles have a spec­tac­u­lar thing in com­mon, and that is every one of them is con­sid­ered unique and dif­fer­ent.” (Hous­ing mar­ket a ‘time bomb’, says invest­ment leg­end: The Aus­tralian June 16, 2010)

Preliminary Remarks

As not­ed in Debt­watch No. 44, I have stopped writ­ing the month­ly Debt­watch Report to focus on my more long term research. I’m still post­ing occa­sion­al blog posts when I feel the need—like the two recent­ly on Aus­trali­a’s new resources tax—but gen­er­al­ly I’ll be work­ing on more tech­ni­cal mat­ters, and post­ing entries based on those here in lieu of the more top­i­cal Debt­watch. This post is a halfway post between the two: it’s a paper that I have just sub­mit­ted to the 2010 Aus­tralian Con­fer­ence of Econ­o­mists, which will be held in Syd­ney in Sep­tem­ber. I have writ­ten it large­ly as a brief­ing paper for main­stream econ­o­mists who would not have come across the analy­sis that I present here before, let alone the vast vol­ume of lit­er­a­ture in Post Key­ne­sian and Aus­tri­an eco­nom­ics.

I will be in Boston and New York soon, either side of the Hyman Min­sky Con­fer­ence that I’m speak­ing at at the Levy Insti­tute.

I am com­mit­ted to meet­ings on Tues­day-Wednes­day June 22–23 (and pos­si­bly Fri­day June 25), to the Levy con­fer­ence June 27–29, and there may be a sem­i­nar joint­ly organ­ised with Eric Jan­szen of iTulip on July 2. I will be free at oth­er times, and open to sug­ges­tions for meet­ings or sem­i­nars. If you’d like to arrange some­thing, please con­tact me via my gmail email address (debunk­ing at gmail.com) or via a com­ment to this blog entry.

As I explained in my last post, the cost curve in the Trea­sury’s mod­el of the RSPT is based on a fan­ta­sy. The sit­u­a­tion is even worse when we turn to the oth­er side of the mod­el, the demand curve: it is based not mere­ly on a fan­ta­sy, but an out­right fal­la­cy.

Legions of econ­o­mists believe that the demand curve for a com­pet­i­tive firm is hor­i­zon­tal, but their belief is based on the most fun­da­men­tal of math­e­mat­i­cal errors: con­fus­ing a very small amount (an infin­i­tes­i­mal) with zero. The Trea­sury repeats this fallacy—without know­ing it is one—in its expla­na­tion of why a roy­al­ty reduces out­put lev­els but the RSPT won’t.